1. US President Trump has campaigned on promises to pull the US out of key multilateral institutions. What do you expect from the next Trump administration’s agenda on global governance and what would you consider the key concerns from a multilateral perspective?
Trump 2.0 will likely double down on his “America First” foreign policy from his first administration. This will pose a severe challenge to the rules-based multilateral order and global efforts addressing crucial issues like climate change, humanitarian and health crises, and free trade.
It seems likely that under Trump 2.0, the US will again consider withdrawing its membership and financial support to those multilateral institutions that the administration deems to be in conflict with American goals. Blueprints for his second term by the America First Institute and Project2025 explicitly reference a need to review US involvement in institutions like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank, the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Paris Agreement, and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). These are many of the same institutions that Trump blocked, cut funding for, or pulled out of during his first term in office and has continued to criticise over the course of the last months.
Trump’s attacks on multilateral institutions have called into question the organisations’ policies and overall validity. This is despite the fact that the US was instrumental in the creation of many key multilateral bodies and has traditionally been the largest contributor to them. For this reason, a termination of material and political support to these organisations under a second Trump presidency would be a significant blow against multilateral cooperation and the major global challenges they were set up to address.
However, the fate of multilateral institutions is not solely determined by the US. Other member states and the bureaucracies of international organisations (IOs) can take the fate of the rules-based multilateral order into their own hands. During Trump 2.0, advocates of multilateralism must assume responsibility and defend challenged institutions – much as they did during Trump’s first term in office.
2. Your research focuses on the role of IOs in the multilateral system. Given the Trump administration’s skepticism – or even outright hostility – towards major IOs, how should defenders of multilateral cooperation move forward?
IOs are an essential part of global governance. They bring together international perspectives and important expertise to more effectively address the most pressing problems of our time. The legitimacy of their decisions is derived, in part, from their inclusive,often universal membership and formal rules which ensure even weaker states are given a voice. But this is also what makes them so unattractive to Trump. To make space for everyone in the decision-making process, IOs often put constraints on the most powerful countries,including the US, preventing them from easily pushing through their preferred policies.
In the face of the antagonism of Trump 2.0, defenders of multilateral cooperation generally have two options for preserving or even strengthening the role of IOs. Option one would involve trying to keep the US at the table by making efforts to accommodate Trump. Preventing the escalation of US contestation to the point of withdrawal is important because of the country’s overall power and relevance to global problems. Appeasing Trump 2.0 could involve targeted reforms, much like we saw under Trump 1.0 in the case of NATO (where allies increased their defence spending) and the World Bank (which set up the “Ivanka Fund”). Defenders of multilateralism could also provide the US with more control over IO decision-making, as a lack of blocking power within IOs was a key reason for the escalation of US contestation in the past. For example, Trump 1.0 withdrew the US from the UN Human Rights Council because it was unable to block majority decisions condemning Israel. Further, the US could be granted special veto rights or privileged positions in IOs’ bureaucracies to ensure that no decisions run against their core interests. In the WTO, for example, where Trump 2.0 will likely continue blocking the binding dispute-settlement mechanism, the consent procedure could be reintroduced for individual decisions. This would allow the US to reject decisions that it finds unfair without blocking the institution as a whole.
The fate of multilateral institutions is not solely determined by the US.
The other option would be for defenders of multilateralism to resist Trump’s demands, defend institutions against his criticism, and build coalitions of powerful states to fill the gap left when the US decides to withdraw. In this scenario, alternative leaders could also leverage minilateral, informal institutions to stabilise – though not replace – formal multilateral institutions. This strategy already worked during Trump 1.0. For example, in the case of the WTO, the EU not only defended the principle of free trade and binding dispute-settlement against the American administration but also rallied a coalition of like-minded states to set up an informal workaround: the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA). Similarly, in the case of the Paris Agreement, the EU together with Canada and China initiated the Ministerial on Climate Action to build a coalition of major economies and emitters that substituted for the loss of US support for global climate goals.
3. You suggest that European leaders have a choice between pacifying Trump or substituting the US in multilateral institutions. How should Europe decide which approach to take?What specific steps should European leaders take to achieve a resilient multilateralism?
To preserve the relevance and problem-solving capacity of multilateral institutions in the global governance infrastructure, it is preferable to keep the US at the table. European leaders should, therefore, try to accommodate the US within multilateral institutions – insofar as US demands do not go against their fundamental principles. During his first term in office, Trump demonstrated his receptiveness for concessions and his contestation can likely be de-escalated again using this approach.
Rather than granting Trump quick victories, Europeans should try to channel his criticism into reforms that increase multilateral institutions’ overall resilience beyond a specific leader or country. First, making efforts to ensure contributions to multilateral cooperation are more evenly distributed across their membership will fortify them against the withdrawal of support by any single state. Second, strengthening IO secretariats would empower international bureaucrats to step up for the survival of their organisations and principles. Finally, increasing the institutional blocking power of the most important member states beyond the US could also offer an opportunity to accommodate other powerful critics of the current order, such China and India.
That said, it will be important for European leaders not to concede to US demands in cases where Trump 2.0 challenges the very foundations of multilateral institutions. Europe should focus on maintaining its reputation as a principled defender of multilateralism and the soft power that comes with it. This power will be important for building broad coalitions with non-Western partners in cases where Trump is not willing to make a (reasonable) deal and withdraws the US from multilateral institutions. The EU and its member states should then act as alternative leaders and rally supporters to fill the gap left by the US.
Europe should focus on maintaining its reputation as a principled defender of multilateralism and the soft power that comes with it.
Alternative leadership by Europe will not come without challenges. Aggravated geopolitical conflicts, convincing non-Western partners to maintain multilateral institutions, and the likely threat of retaliation from the US – in the form of both sanctions and the withdrawal of security commitments – could all undermine these efforts. The EU’s failure to save the “Iran Deal” after the US weaponised the Dollar and leveraged its control over the international financial infrastructure showcased Europe’s vulnerability in the realm of hard power.
No matter what response European leaders choose in each institution, it is imperative that they pool and expand their independent capabilities – from defence to finance. This will allow them to share the burden of multilateral cooperation, to compensate for potential US withdrawal, and to withstand likely US pressure to abandon institutions that are in its vital interest. Only a stronger Europe can contribute to stronger multilateralism!
Tim Heinkelmann-Wild is a Senior Researcher and Lecturer at LMU Munich’s Geschwister-Scholl-Institute of Political Science.
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