BRICS and Multilateralism: Four Dynamics to Watch at the Kazan Summit

By
Mihaela Papa
Mihaela Papa
BRICS and Multilateralism: Four Dynamics to Watch at the Kazan Summit
Abstract
Download PDF
The 2024 summit in Kazan, Russia, will be the first real test of whether the now-expanded BRICS can effectively collaborate on new initiatives and potentially lead the "global majority." Here's why the EU and others should pay attention.

From its origins as a relatively obscure coalition less than two decades ago to its status as one of the most sought-after international institutions today, the BRICS group has established itself as a fixture of global governance.  Its long-standing members – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – have been collaborating to reshape the international system according to their priorities. The group’s recent membership expansion has solidified its role as a hub for cooperation among major non-Western countries seeking deeper coordination and broader global governance reforms.

The upcoming BRICS summit, which will take place in the Russian city of Kazan from October 22 to 24, 2024, will be a critical test of the group’s capacity to sustain its growth and work toward uniting the countries of the “global majority.” To understand the implications of the enlarged BRICS group for Western global governance agendas, here are the key dynamics to watch.

The Stakes of the Kazan Summit

The 2024 BRICS summit marks a key moment in Russia’s ongoing BRICS presidency, which began last January under the motto “Strengthening Multilateralism for Equitable Global Development and Security.” BRICS wants to reimagine and reform the global system to better reflect contemporary political and economic realities as well as its own priorities.

The stakes are high for both Russia and the group. Moscow is facing extensive Western sanctions due to its war against Ukraine, which makes its presidency both controversial and strategically significant, especially given its eagerness to engage BRICS partners through new initiatives. Historically, Russia has played an instrumental role in shaping the BRICS agenda, and its previous presidencies have resulted in major institutional progress. Russia launched the group as an independent body in 2009 in the BRIC format and set it up for growth. Its 2015 presidency added numerous working groups and strengthened civil society cooperation, while its 2020 leadership coordinated members’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic and endorsed the BRICS Economic Cooperation Strategy 2025.

But this presidency is also critical for Russia because its influence in chairing the group and setting the agenda will diminish with new members – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and potentially Saudi Arabia and other countries – assuming future presidencies. (While Saudi Arabia regularly engages with the group, it is still considering full BRICS membership.) Consequently, Russia requires a strong commitment from BRICS to advance its priority agenda of launching an independent payment system and "de-dollarisation" to pave the way for a global monetary reset.  

In addition, BRICS as a whole is also at a crossroads. In 2023, the group gained substantial traction, with 23 states applying for membership and 40 expressing interest. After the recent expansion, there are still 34 countries that indicated their desire to join. At the same time, BRICS has faced criticism both internally and externally, including over concerns about China’s disproportionate power and human rights issues, such as the shielding of Russian President Vladimir Putin from arrest. Nevertheless, the group continues to evolve, serving as a barometer for broader trends in multilateralism. The Kazan summit will reveal whether BRICS can deliver a vision of a new global order and effectively operate at scale or whether internal fractures will hamper its ability to sustain momentum.

The BRICS Way of Multilateralism

BRICS has proven effective in fostering cooperation among diverse countries, leading to the establishment of the New Development Bank (NDB) and initiatives in a wide range of areas such as industrial development, trade, health, agriculture, science, energy, space, and digital technology. This evolution has created a complex and extensive institutional infrastructure that reinforces multilateral cooperation among its members.

However, the core issue facing the group is whether it can pioneer a new form of multilateralism that upholds its normative principles like sovereignty, collective action at the UN level to protect the most vulnerable, and sustainable development while transcending traditional power dynamics. To sustain its multilateral momentum, BRICS must pragmatically address structural concerns within the current system and build communities through inclusion rather than exclusion.

Negotiating Structural Concerns About the Global System

BRICS’ approach to multilateralism is centred around its core goals: advocating for global governance reforms, especially regarding the global economic and financial infrastructure; seeking a “more democratic and just multi-polar world order”; and advancing cooperation while “serving common interests of emerging market economies and developing countries.” These objectives echo historical initiatives like the New International Economic Order and respond to the shortcomings of the global effort to improve well-being through the Sustainable Development Goals, with only 16 percent of targets currently on track to be reached by 2030.  

However, so far, the group’s record in enacting system-wide reforms is limited. BRICS’ early initiatives, such as its call for diversifying leadership positions in key international institutions to challenge the current arrangement where the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is led by a European and the World Bank by an American, raise questions about the group’s ability to spearhead diversity, equity and inclusion policies at the global level. BRICS countries’ calls for adjustments to IMF quotas resulted in some progress during the 2010 IMF reforms. However, the group has sought more comprehensive changes that have yet to be realized. Russia is now trying to mobilize BRICS to create an alternative to the IMF; however, prior efforts, like establishing the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, have actually reinforced the group’s reliance on the IMF.

So far, the group’s record in enacting systemwide reforms is limited.

BRICS has also faced significant obstacles in achieving consensus on UN reforms. For years, Brazil, India and South Africa have sought to use the BRICS platform to advocate for Security Council reform. Last year, the group’s membership criteria specified for the first time that any new BRICS member must support the aspirations of these three countries for a greater role in the Security Council. However, this year's meeting of BRICS foreign ministers amid UN reform talks failed to produce a consensus on the communiqué as Egypt and Ethiopia reportedly refused to sign, citing a lack of agreement on which country should represent Africa in the UN’s highest body. Such a lack of cohesion is likely to persist, but the BRICS group has a combination of features that sustain its momentum in pursuing structural change.

First, it is an exclusive club of influential countries, allowing it to move faster than larger groupings like the G77. Moreover, given that some powerful BRICS countries are under international sanctions, the incentive for members to coordinate on international monetary matters is particularly strong. Yet the club model also highlights a paradox: While BRICS seeks to promote inclusion and elevate countries at the global level, it accepts only those who “have strong economic standing and influence.”

Second, the creation of the NDB has increased BRICS’ interconnectedness and demonstrated that it is possible to jointly develop non-Western governance infrastructure. While the NDB and the group are related, they have different memberships. For BRICS to evolve as a geostrategic actor, implement economic and sustainable development agendas, and enhance its legitimacy in the Global South, it needs to better align with the NDB, which has the potential to serve as a clearing house and facilitator of various monetary initiatives.

Finally, BRICS can attract countries harbouring grievances against the West and those seeking alternatives in a global system where US foreign policy has become unpredictable and the EU’s expansion agenda is hampered by technocratic processes and a waning sense of direction.

Consolidating the “Global Majority”: BRICS as a Focal Point

BRICS aims to play a key role in global governance and demonstrate collective leadership. But its design complicates these aspirations. When each member contributes only what it prefers, avoiding actions it dislikes or scrutiny over transgressions, efforts to uphold international legal principles take a backseat to maintaining the BRICS process. While the group may seek to enhance international law, protect sovereignty, and implement its counter-terrorism strategy, it lacks a unified stance on major geopolitical conflicts where these principles are at stake and leadership is needed. Nonetheless, its flexibility has reinforced its role as a focal point for cooperation among member states.

BRICS aims to demonstrate collective leadership. But its design complicates these aspirations.

Simultaneously, the group strives to represent the "global majority" and transform global governance to better reflect its priorities. However, BRICS officials’ messaging about the value of the current system and their openness to collaborating with Western countries has varied. Last year, South Africa’s ambassador to BRICS, Anil Sooklal, compared the international system to apartheid South Africa, where the minority decided for the majority. Russia’s new foreign policy concept of a “world majority” suggests that the country does not believe that reforming the system is feasible and seeks to communicate this to other countries and to envision a new infrastructure. China has amplified its criticism of the US, and Iran, traditionally anti-Western, is now a full BRICS member.

Additionally, the group has barred countries that impose sanctions on its members, effectively excluding most Western nations from membership. This restriction limits its potential to serve as a broader forum for global multilateralism. With a limited pool of potential members and the veto power each state holds over new entrants, BRICS will find it challenging to absorb a global majority of countries. BRICS’ recent establishment of the Association of BRICS+ Cities and Municipalities offers a possible avenue for broadening its coalition in light of constraints at the state level.

The BRICS approach signals that summitry focused on normative change is becoming a more common mode of international problem-solving.

BRICS is taking multilateralism into uncharted waters. For some, we are in a “recollections may vary” phase of international law, where weak global institutions struggle to remain relevant while informal institutions increasingly shape global governance. For others, this moment presents an opportunity to experiment with new models of collective leadership, cultural pluralism, political checks and balances, and a stronger focus on advancing the right to development. That said, the BRICS approach also raises practical questions about the future of multilateralism. It signals that summitry focused on normative change is becoming a more common mode of international problem-solving – one that prioritises process and community-building over formal rules and compliance. This trend is also visible in the G20 and global climate negotiations. If global deadlocks continue to hinder collective action, there may be increasing demand for stronger accountability mechanisms, including greater reliance on international courts, deeper regional integration, and a reassessment of subsidiarity principles to create new pathways for governance.

Finally, the BRICS approach to multilateralism invites broader reflection on the best strategy for transforming the global system. Is it more feasible to reform existing institutions or to create new ones? Ideally, sustainable global governance would involve applying circular economy principles to institutional management, both to mitigate the negative impacts of outdated institutions by reducing, reusing and recycling them, and to explore new ways to restore and regenerate the global institutional architecture.

Four Trends to Watch at the Kazan Summit

  1. Implications of the new expanded format: The 2024 Kazan summit will be the first comprehensive test of whether the expanded BRICS can maintain its momentum in producing joint outcomes that substantively advance the group’s institutional development. If the expanded group can reach agreements on critical initiatives, it will signal that BRICS remains an effective and promising platform for cooperation, despite its increasingly diverse membership.
  2. Progress on monetary cooperation: In their 2023 summit declaration, BRICS leaders set themselves a one-year deadline for reporting on their countries’ progress in using local currencies, payment instruments and platforms. Despite disagreements over what deeper monetary integration among BRICS members should look like and whether a common BRICS currency is desirable or feasible, the group has prioritised monetary coordination throughout the year leading up to the Kazan summit and will present its findings there. Another potential area of development is the creation of a BRICS grain exchange, which would allow members to trade commodities in currencies other than the US dollar. Any advancement in these areas could pave the way for an accelerated “de-dollarisation” and bolster BRICS’ efforts to reduce their dependence on Western financial systems.
  3. Engagement with the Middle East and Palestinian statehood: As tensions in the Middle East rise, this summit will reveal whether BRICS intends to deepen its engagement with the region and take a more assertive stance on key conflicts. The escalating clashes between Israel and Iran as well as the future of Palestinian statehood are central issues. In June, BRICS issued a joint statement criticising Israel’s military actions in Rafah, and in October, Iran – now a BRICS member – launched its second missile attack on Israel this year. Although Palestine expressed its interest in a BRICS membership last year, it was not invited to join. This year, Russia has allocated a special session for Palestine, which plans to formally apply for membership after the summit. Since BRICS only admits UN member states, its position on Palestinian statehood will likely be on the agenda, too.
  4. Management of prospective members: BRICS faces challenges in managing prospective members. Russia has prioritised integrating new members but has sent mixed signals about admitting those on the waitlist. While Russia and China have advocated for expanding BRICS to consolidate the global majority and signalled to prospective members like Türkiye that the group is open to new entries, BRICS has paused admissions of full members. Instead, it is creating a new category of partner countries to formalise relationships with those expressing interest and will likely announce this in Kazan. Naming new partners is particularly relevant given the growing pushback from excluded countries. Algeria, for instance, even withdrew its bid, criticising a lack of clear reasoning for its exclusion, and turned to other fora such as the Non-Aligned Movement. If BRICS waits too long to expand further, prospective members may form their own coalitions, both to increase their negotiation leverage vis-à-vis the group and to create other types of cooperative arrangements.

Overall, BRICS’ ability to preserve its multilateral moment is strong but not guaranteed. The four dynamics outlined above will serve as key indicators for the group’s geopolitical direction and related implications for global governance. If Western countries want to prevent further global polarisation, they must maintain open communication channels with various BRICS countries and continue advancing reforms in global governance. Geopolitically, BRICS expansion is already impacting EU enlargement policy. As some candidate countries like Türkiye and Serbia draw closer to BRICS, the EU must determine whether their potential BRICS membership aligns with the Union’s own aspirations.

In any case, BRICS will require pragmatism and skilled diplomacy to operate effectively at scale and set the stage for a new era of global collective action. Now is the time for all actors to enhance policy entrepreneurship and de-escalate rising tensions.

Mihaela Papa is the Director of Research and a Principal Research Scientist at the MIT Center for International Studies. Her recent publications include developing a BRICS Convergence Index (EJIR 2023), an analysis of leadership within BRICS (Contemporary Politics, 2023), and a study of BRICS' de-dollarisation initiatives (CUP Elements, 2022).

Photo: MEAphotogallery (via Flickr; CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)
This policy brief is available for download.
Get PDF
Get PDF
No items found.